The “Stranger to the Adoption” Doctrine Bars Adult Adoptee from Receiving a Class Gift Held in Trust for “Children”
Ben’s parents established two family trusts. The trusts provided a residuary class gift to each of Ben’s children, and each of his grandchildren were secondary beneficiaries. The 1994 trust stated that “the word ‘children’ and ‘issue’ shall include adopted children…” The 1979 trust stated that “all references herein to ‘issue,’ child’ or ‘children’ shall be deemed to refer only to issue, child or children born of lawful wedlock or legally adopted.” The trusts did not expressly address whether they included adopted adults.
While they were alive, Ben’s parents employed a nurse’s assistant (“Karina”), who had a son (“Carl”). Ben’s father died in 2005. In 2007, Karina began working as an aide and housekeeper for Ben. That same year, Ben divorced his first wife; he married Karina six months later. Ben’s mother died in 2010.
Seven years after Ben’s mother’s death, Ben legally adopted Karina’s son Carl, who was then eighteen years old. Thereafter, the trustees of the trusts filed a declaratory judgment action to exclude Carl from class gifts intended for Ben’s children. Ben and Carl sought to have Carl included as a class beneficiary of the trusts, as an adopted child.
A trial was conducted and the trial court granted the trustees’ application to exclude Carl as a beneficiary. Ben and Carl appealed.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude Carl as a trust beneficiary.
First, the Appellate Division noted that the plain language of both trusts referred to adopted “children,” defined by law as a person under the age of majority. At the trial, the defendants (Ben and Carl) had presented no evidence regarding Ben’s parents’ reasons for including “adopted children” in the trusts. Consequently, the appeals court concluded that the trial court had properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The Appellate Division then addressed the “stranger to the adoption” doctrine, which the trial court had applied when it placed the burden of proving probable intent on the defendants.
As the appellate court explained, the “stranger to the adoption” doctrine applies a presumption that an adopted child cannot take property under a trust or other instrument that was not created by the adoptive parent, unless the trust or instrument itself shows a specific intent that the adopted child should take. The adult adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-3, provides that an adopted adult cannot take property if a trust limits distribution to “heirs of the body.” However, the judicial “stranger to the adoption” doctrine expands upon the adult adoption statute: it provides that an adopted adult cannot take property of a trust or other instrument if the instrument was created by a stranger to the adoption, and the instrument does not make a specific provision for the specific adult adoptee.
In distinguishing between the treatment of child and adult adoptees, the court relied on prior case law, which held that, although the adoption of a child has become “relatively commonplace,” it is “extremely unlikely” that the person creating a will or trust would foresee that a beneficiary “might at some time in the future adopt an adult.”
A copy of In re 1979 Inter Vivos Trust of Sanzari can be found here.