A husband and wife, Peter and Nghia, executed Wills on the same day, and both had similar directions. They died eight months apart. Because the Wills had similar provisions, the court focused on the husband Peter’s Will, concluding that the same result would attach to the construction of Nghia’s Will.
The Wills named their daughter Thu as Executrix and directed that, after payment of debts, the “rest, residue and remainder” was to pass to their son Chinh. The sentence that followed, however, stated that the decedent “knew” that the son Chinh “will carry out my instructions for care of [Chinh’s] mothers, brothers and sisters.”
Chinh and Thu filed competing claims regarding the interpretation of these provisions.
In an earlier summary judgment motion (heard by a different judge), the judge had concluded that the sentence regarding Chinh carrying out “instructions” did not impose a legal obligation on Chinh, and that the wording did not reveal an intent to create a trust in the Will. Both parties filed motions for reconsideration of that prior order.
On reconsideration, the new chancery judge concluded that the prior order had been erroneous, and vacated summary judgment. As the judge noted,
[t]o be sure, there are many peculiarities about this case. But those peculiarities counsel against a summary disposition about Peter’s alleged intent to create a trust. Ambiguities abound and preclude summary judgment.
As the judge explained, the construction of Wills is governed by the doctrine of probable intent, in which courts must consider “more than a Will’s isolated sentences or phrases,” and must give “primary emphasis” to the testator’s “dominant plan and purpose as they appear from the entirety of [the] Will when read and considered in light of the surrounding facts and circumstances.” To do so, courts may look beyond the language of the Will and consider extrinsic evidence to “accomplish what would have been done had the testator envisioned the present inquiry.” Consequently, the judge reasoned that “it is thus clear…that a Will may be construed to create a testamentary trust even if the word “trust” dose not appear within the four corners so long as the evidence reveals that that was the testator’s probable intent.” To make that determination, a hearing would be required.
The judge also noted that Chinh’s interpretation of the Will would require an assumption that the testator had intended to disinherit the other children, who are considered the natural objects of a testator’s bounty. According to the judge, information about Vietnamese culture might also shed light on Peter’s intentions when he made his Will.
A copy of the Superior Court, Chancery Division decision of consolidated actions In re Estate of Vuong; In re Estate of Le can be found here.